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Abstract:  New multilateral trade negotiations under the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
were initiated for agriculture in 2000. International trade is particularly important for cotton, 
since 30 percent of the world’s consumption  of cotton fiber crosses international  borders 
before consumption by textile mills, and, through trade in yarn, fabric, and clothing, much of 
the world’s cotton crosses international borders at least once more before reaching its final 
consumers. Traditionally, cotton’s global import barriers have been low, and export subsidies 
have been largely negligible. Textile trade, however, has long been subject to government 
intervention across the world, indirectly affecting cotton. Furthermore, export restrictions by 
cotton-producing countries have been common in the past, as governments indirectly subsi- 
dize textile output by assuring their domestic textile industries of preferential access to local- 
ly produced cotton. Textile policies are an important concern of developing countries, and 
could receive further scrutiny in any future WTO round. Other WTO issues related to cotton 
trade include China’s accession to the WTO, the accession of Central Asian cotton exporters 
such as Uzbekistan, the role of State Trading Enterprises (STE) in these and other countries, 
and domestic support for agriculture. 
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Introduction 
 
International trade is particularly important for cotton, since 
30 percent of the world’s consumption of cotton fiber crosses 
international borders before consumption by textile mills: a 
larger role for trade than is the case for wheat, corn, 
soybeans, or rice. Furthermore, through trade in yarn, fabric, 
and clothing, much of the world’s cotton crosses interna - 
tional borders at least once more before reaching its final 
consumers. Cotton exports are particularly important for the 
U.S. cotton industry, with about 40 percent of the U.S. cot - 
ton harvest exported during the 1990’s. 
 
New multilateral trade negotiations under the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) were initiated in 2000. During these 
negotiations, officials from WTO member countries will 
work to continue the process of reforming agricultural trade 
rules begun in the Uruguay Round, which concluded in 
1994. The traditional prevalence of low tariffs and limited 
non-tariff barriers among major cotton importers limited the 
impact on cotton of the market access provisions of the 
Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture (URAA). 
However, the newfound importance of cotton-producing 
countries as importers means market access issues could 
grow in importance for cotton. While export subsidies for 
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cotton by WTO signatories have been negligible, govern- 
ment policies governing the role of State Trading 
Enterprises (STE) and support of local textile industries 
have affected cotton trade. While textiles trade rules are not 
a subject of the current negotiations, they are an important 
multilateral trade issue affecting cotton, and significant 
changes in textile import barriers are mandated by 2005 
under the Uruguay Round’s Agreement on Textiles and 
Clothing (ATC). Other WTO issues related to cotton trade 
include China’s accession to the WTO, the accession of 
Central Asian cotton exporters such as Uzbekistan, the role 
of State Trading Enterprises (STE) in these and other coun- 
tries, and domestic support for agriculture. 
 
World Cotton Production, 
Consumption, and Trade 
 
The world’s four largest cotton producing and consuming 
countries are China, the United States, India, and Pakistan. 
Together, these four account for around 60 percent of world 
production and consumption. The next three largest consum- 
ing countries are Turkey, Brazil, and Mexico, all of which 
produce cotton but are often large importers nonetheless. 
Cotton is mostly a Northern Hemisphere crop, but about 10 
percent of the world’s output comes from south of the equa - 
tor—primarily Brazil and Australia—and is harvested dur- 
ing the Northern Hemisphere’s spring. 
18   Cotton and Wool Situation and Outlook/CWS-2000/November 2000   
The United States is the world’s leading cotton exporter, 
accounting for 25 percent of world trade during the 1990’s 
(fig. A-1). In recent years, six importers have accounted for 
40 percent of world trade—the European Union (EU), 
Indonesia, China, Brazil, South Korea, and Thailand. The 
United States exports to all these major markets, but only 
accounts for a small share of imports by the EU and Brazil. 
These markets are largely served by the leading U.S. com- 
petitors from Central Asia, West Africa, and the Southern 
Hemisphere. The leading markets for the United States are 
Mexico, Turkey, Japan, and Korea (accounting for about half 
of U.S. exports). 
 
The United States ranks second in world cotton production, 
third in world cotton consumption, and third in the size of its 
ending stocks. Imports by the United States are mini- mal—
less than 1 percent of the world’s total on average in recent 
years—but since 1994 have expanded from a level of 
virtually zero maintained during the previous two decades. 
 
World cotton trade shrank during the 1990’s, as one of the 
world’s largest textile industries—Russia’s—collapsed. 
World consumption stagnated during most of the 1990’s as 
Russia’s collapse offset increased consumption by India, 
Turkey, Mexico, Pakistan, and the United States. World cot- 
ton consumption rose sharply in 1999/2000, and another 
record-high is expected in 2000/01. However, world trade 
remains close to the average level of the last decade since 
recent cotton consumption increases have largely occurred in 
countries producing most of their own cotton. 
 
The Uruguay Round’s Impact on 
Agricultural and Textiles Trade Rules 
 
The Uruguay Round of Trade Negotiations began in 1986 
and culminated with the signing of the Uruguay Round 
Agreements at Marakesh in 1994. Three of these agreements 
are of particular importance to cotton:  those concerning 
agriculture, textiles, and dispute settlement. 
 
The Uruguay Round marked the first major effort by the 
General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade (GATT, the prede- 
cessor organization to the WTO) to include trade liberaliza- 
tion in agriculture as a central objective, resulting in the 
URAA. The URAA required signatories in many cases to 
cut average tariff levels on all agricultural products by set 
percentages, reduce the value and volume of subsidized 
exports, and lower aggregate spending on some domestic 
support programs for agriculture. A separate agreement also 
established new disciplines on the use of sanitary and phy - 
tosanitary (SPS) measures that could be used to unjustifi - 
ably restrict trade based on health and safety concerns. 
 
In textiles, the Uruguay Round’s ATC addressed the long- 
standing divergence of global textile trade from the GATT 
principles of reciprocity and nondiscrimination that resulted 
from the application of bilateral quotas under the Multifiber 
Arrangement (MFA). The ATC mandates a schedule for the 
progressive elimination of MFA quota restraints by 2005, and 
also mandates that non-MFA restrictions not justified under a 
GATT provision also be phased out by no later than 2005. 
 
The Uruguay Round Understanding on Rules and Procedures 
Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU) was also a 
significant outcome of the Uruguay Round nego - tiations. 
The DSU extended greater automaticity to the adoption of 
dispute panel findings and the Appellate Body’s findings. 
Previously, the consent of the parties to a dispute was 
necessary for the adoption of a panel’s findings, limit- ing 
the usefulness of the dispute settlement mechanism for 
contentious issues. 
 
Uruguay Round Agreement 
On Agriculture 
 
Because the main provisions of the URAA are detailed else- 
where (see USDA, 1998), only a general overview of the 
main accomplishments are given in the section below for 
market access, export subsidies and domestic support. Trade 
issues related specifically to the cotton sector are then dis - 
cussed in more detail. 
 
Market access—The URAA required participating countries 
to reduce “base” period (those in effect in 1986 or 1986-88) 
tariffs on agricultural products by an average of 36 percent 
for developed countries and 24 percent for developing 
nations, and to cap tariffs at a final “bound” level by the end 
of the implementation period. The minimum tariff cut on 
each product is 15 percent (10 percent for developing coun- 
tries). The agreement also required signatories to convert all 
non-tariff agricultural trade barriers to tariffs. Countries 
doing so established a two-tiered tariff system (a tariff-rate 
quota, or TRQ) in which a lower tariff applies to a quota of 
imports and higher tariffs to imports beyond the quota level 
(USDA, 1998). 
 
Export subsidies—Twenty-five WTO member countries 
agreed to reduce the volume and value of their subsidized 
agricultural exports from base period levels. Four countries 
made specific commitments to reduce subsidized cotton 
exports. However, none of these countries are significant 
exporters, the total volume of subsidized cotton permitted 
each year by the URAA is negligible, and the countries com- 
mitted to reducing subsidized cotton exports have subsidized 
exports of virtually no cotton since the signing of the URAA. 
China subsidized a substantial volume of cotton exports 
recently, but China is not currently a WTO member and 
agreed to refrain from further subsidies in the U.S.-China 
bilateral agreement for China’s accession to the WTO. 
 
Domestic support—Policies such as price supports and other 
types of subsidized production have the potential to distort 
trade flows by reducing imports below levels that would nor- 
mally occur, or by encouraging the use of export subsidies to 
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dispose of excess domestic production. The URAA required 
countries to reduce and cap total outlays, as measured by the 
Aggregate Measurement of Support (AMS), on certain 
domestic policies that provide producers with direct incen- 
tives to increase production. For developed countries, the 
AMS is to be reduced from base period (1986-88) amounts 
by 20 percent over a 6-year (implementation) period. 
 
The EU, the United States, and Japan, have the most sub- 
stantial domestic support programs of the 29 WTO members 
that agreed to these limits. Of the $285 billion spent on agri- 
cultural support programs by the 29 countries in 1995, the 
EU ($113 billion), Japan ($70 billion), and the United States 
($61 billion) accounted for about 85 percent. For the EU 
and Japan, the majority of that spending (50-55 percent) was 
on “amber box” policies that counted towards their AMS 
limits, in contrast to only 10 percent for the United States. 
 
The URAA divided support on domestic programs into three 
categories indicating the relative trade-distorting effects of 
the policies:  1) “amber box” policies, such as price 
supports, marketing loans, and loan deficiency pay- ments, 
which are subject to reduction and final spending limits; 2) 
“blue box” policies, which are exempt from limits because 
payments are tied to production limitations by bas- 
ing payments on fixed area or yield, or on a maximum of 85 
percent of base production; and 3) “green box” policies, 
such as domestic food aid (e.g. food stamps) and de-coupled 
income support (e.g. U.S. production flexibility contract 
payments) which are also exempt from limits. 
 
Only amber box policies count towards the AMS limits each 
country can provide. In addition, support from policies that 
would otherwise be considered “amber box” are not counted 
towards the AMS if support for a specific commodity is 
equal to or less than 5 percent of the value of that commod - 
ity’s production in any given year. This is known as the de 
minimis exemption. The de minimis exemption also applies 
to noncommodity-specific programs, such as crop insurance, 
as long as support for all such programs remains below 5 
percent of the value of all agricultural production. 
 
Domestic Support in the European Union 
And the United States 
 
The world’s largest cotton importer is the EU, which main- 
tains no tariffs or significant non-tariff barriers on cotton 
imports. However, generous domestic support has driven 
cotton production in Greece and Spain steadily higher since 
their accession to the EU in the first half of the 1980’s. From 
a 1975-79 average of 795,000 bales, EU cotton pro- duction 
soared 227 percent, to reach 2.6 million bales in 
1999/2000. Generous support has ensured that cotton has 
become the major field crop in Greece in terms of planted 
area and income, and Greece has become one of the world’s 
largest exporters (mostly to other EU countries and Turkey) 
(fig. A-1). While the EU has instituted co-responsibility 
levies triggered by production ceilings to moderate the 
impact of its generous guide price, the EU notified the WTO 
of payments totaling 809 million ECU in 1997/98—an 
amount comparable with the entire value of the crop. 
 
In the United States, beginning in 1996, deficiency pay- 
ments to cotton were replaced by de-coupled income sup - 
port payments (production flexibility contracts, PFC), and 
both of these payments are exempt from reduction. Amber 
box support to cotton includes the U.S. User Marketing 
Certificate Program (Step 2 of the Marketing Loan Program 
for Upland Cotton—for details on Step 2, see MacDonald 
and Meyer, 1999), nonrecourse marketing loans, and loan 
deficiency payments. Until 1997/98, support to cotton was 
below the de minimis threshhold and not included in the 
total AMS. Step 2 payments totaled $416 million during 
1997/98, accounting for most of cotton’s product-specific 
contribution to the $6.24 billion U.S. AMS during 1997. In 
1998 and 1999, payments under the nonrecourse loan pro- 
gram and loan deficiency payments have increased, surpass - 
ing 5 percent of the value of U.S. production, as did Step 2 
payments. In addition, due to falling farm incomes and 
weather-related disasters, the U.S. Congress provided sup - 
plemental emergency assistance (AMTA) payments to recip- 
ients of PFC payments in both 1998 and 1999, but no 
decision has been made on how the supplemental payments 
will be notified to the WTO (Dohlman and Hoffman, 2000). 
However, the United States is still in compliance with its 
commitments on domestic support. 
 
Domestic support programs affecting cotton are also in place 
in China, Turkey, Egypt, Brazil, and Mexico (Valderrama, 
1999). However, according to the International Cotton 
Advisory Committee, except China, the level of assistance 
these countries provide to cotton producers is 
low. The level of domestic support to agriculture provided 
by developed countries is a concern of many developing 
countries. For example, during the 59th Plenary Meeting of 
the International Cotton Advisory Committee in November 
2000, delegates from several countries raised this issue. 
 
Market Access and Cotton Importers 
 
Traditionally, much of the world’s cotton imports have been 
by countries lacking the natural resource endowments neces- 
sary to grow cotton. Accordingly, the most commonly applied 
tariff level is 0 percent. A global import-weighted average of 
applied tariffs reported by UNCTAD is only 2.2 percent. 
Similarly, with little in the way of non-tariff barriers to cotton 
by major importers before the URAA, there have been few 
instances of tariff-rate quota creation since the signing of the 
URAA. The U.S. quantitative restrictions on imports were 
converted to a TRQ now totaling 351,000 bales, and South 
Africa and Colombia also implemented TRQ’s. 
 
However, with respect to bound tariffs, an UNCTAD/WTO 
study indicated the highest and most frequent bound tariff 
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peaks occur in sugar, tobacco, cotton, and prepared fruits and 
vegetables. Generally, cotton-producing countries have 
higher than average tariffs and account for most of the high- 
bound tariffs. For example, Brazil’s most favored nation 
(MFN) average applied tariff is 8 percent, with a bound rate 
of 55 percent. Pakistan’s applied rate is 15 percent and its 
bound rate is 100 percent. An export-weighted average of 
applied tariffs outside the United States is 7.7 percent. 
 
As cotton-producing countries account for a larger share of 
world consumption, their role as importers has also 
increased, and the predisposition of cotton-producing coun- 
tries to develop trade policies that favor domestic cotton 
producers becomes more important. For example, Brazil 
was among the world’s top 10 exporters as recently as 1990, 
but has been one of the world’s largest importers since 
1992. Similarly, Turkey was the world’s second largest 
importer in 1999/2000, and its sixth largest producer. 
Brazil’s tariff applied to U.S. cotton went from 0 percent to 
its current level of 8 percent following Brazil’s MEROSUR 
accession, and Turkey briefly imposed a 25-percent import 
tariff during 1999 in an effort to support its domestic cotton 
industry. Thus, while the market access provisions of the 
URAA had little immediate effect on world cotton trade, the 
assurance of openness and transparency in agricultural trade 
is likely to be increasingly beneficial to cotton exporters like 
the United States. 
 
China’s Reforms and WTO Accession 
 
China was the world’s largest importer during the mid-1990s, 
and in addition to market access, its accession to the WTO 
would involve every major trade issue of importance to cot - 
ton. China is the world’s largest producer and consumer of 
cotton, and is believed to hold 30 percent of world ending 
stocks. It was the only significant exporter of subsidized cot - 
ton in recent years, would have the largest cotton TRQ upon 
accession to the WTO, and is the world’s largest exporter of 
textiles and clothing. The terms and timing of its accession to 
the WTO could have a significant impact on world cotton 
trade, as indeed its unilateral policy shifts already have. 
 
China’s cotton production fluctuated substantially during the 
1990’s, as the adjustment of government-set purchasing 
prices failed to keep pace with changes in agriculture and 
the economy. China’s imports, ending stocks, and exports 
ebbed and flowed as China’s policymakers lowered and 
raised procurement prices, opened and closed import quotas, 
and offered and withdrew export subsidies. At times, China 
was the world’s largest importer (1994/95-96/97), but in 
1998/99 it was the world’s fourth largest exporter. During 
1999/2000, China finally extended to its cotton producers 
the right to sell cotton to state-approved buyers other than 
its domestic procurement agency—the Cotton and Jute 
Bureau—and withdrew from attempting to fix domestic cot - 
ton prices. These changes came more than a decade after 
similar reforms for grains and oilseeds, and the impact of 
these changes on China’s cotton sector remains unclear. 
 
China’s trade policy evolved during the 1990’s from a com- 
plete reliance on an STE—Chinatex—to an extension of 
import and export rights to some local cotton bureaus, state 
farms, and state-owned and joint-venture textile enterprises. 
However, Chinatex remains an important player in China’s 
cotton trade, most of the other entities permitted to trade are 
state-owned, and trade remains strictly regulated by quotas. 
During 1998 and 1999, exports from China’s main produc- 
ing region—Xinjiang-Uighur Autonomous Region—were 
subsidized, and only a small import quota was permitted 
during 2000. 
 
The draft protocol package that would be the basis for WTO 
members’ decision on whether to admit China to the WTO 
remains under negotiation. Under terms of the U.S.-China 
bilateral agreement, which will be incorporated into the final 
WTO, accession protocol, China has committed to eliminate 
nontariff barriers on agricultural imports upon its accession to 
the WTO and it has agreed to implement a series of tariff cuts 
between 2000 and 2004. In addition, China committed to 
establish tariff-rate quotas for wheat, rice, corn, cotton, and 
soybean oil, with gradually increasing quota levels, mostly 
over the same period. 
 
China committed to a tariff-rate quota of 743,000 tons for 
cotton in 2000, increasing to 894,000 in 2004. The within- 
quota import duty would be 1 percent, and the over-quota 
duty would decline from 69 percent in 2000 to 40 percent 
by 2004. Nonstate trade companies with the right to trade 
would be allocated 67 percent of each year’s quota. Use of 
export subsidies for farm products will end and trade-dis- 
torting domestic subsidies will be capped and reduced 
(Colby, et al, 2000). 
 
Developing Countries’ Textile Trade 
Policies and the ATC 
 
China’s accession to the WTO will have a significant impact 
on world textile trade. While the specifics of this impact are 
beyond the scope of this report (see USITC, 1999), WTO 
accession will require China to reduce import barriers to 
textiles and apparel as well as help ensure its access to 
export markets. While the use of quotas under the MFA by 
developed countries has been a concern of developing coun - 
tries, many developing countries have also maintained sig- 
nificant non-tariff barriers against these imports. In some 
cases they have also supported their local industries by regu- 
lating exports of locally produced cotton. Although export 
prohibitions on products other than foodstuffs are not 
addressed by the URAA, they are a form of assistance to 
developing country textile industries, and could be an issue 
in a future trade round. 
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India and Pakistan (which are among the world’s top four 
cotton producers and consumers) traditionally regulated raw 
cotton exports to ensure preferential prices for their domes- 
tic textile industries. During the 1990’s both countries largely 
dismantled their STE’s, and following completion of the 
Uruguay Round negotiations, Pakistan agreed to end its 
minimum export price system and adhere to free trade in the 
export of raw cotton. However, Pakistan has periodically 
announced policies inconsistent with free trade, and reintro - 
duced an STE during 1999/2000. India continues to impose 
raw cotton export quotas—although these quotas are not 
believed to be constraining—and imposed phytosanitary 
barriers to cotton imports from Pakistan during 1999/2000. 
While the Cotton Corporation of India Ltd. (CCI) has lost 
its monopoly role, it remains a significant cotton trading 
organization (Guitchounts, 1998). 
 
The ATC requires reciprocity in market access for textiles, 
and achieving that reciprocity is considered vital by the tex- 
tile industries of countries like the United States, which are 
reducing their textile and apparel protection under the ATC. 
India’s long-standing reliance on the GATT balance-of-pay- 
ments provision to justify virtually prohibitive non-tariff 
barriers to textile imports is expected to end by 2001. India 
committed to remove many yarn, fabric, and apparel imports 
from its restricted licensing list as a result of a U.S.-India 
Market Access Agreement for Textiles and Clothing in 1995. 
A 1999 U.S.-India agreement to lift quantitative restrictions 
on imports of over 1,429 products—including textiles— 
came after India lost its appeal of a dispute panel ruling 
against its use of the balance-of-payments provision to jus- 
tify import restrictions, reflecting the importance of the 
WTO’s new dispute settlement mechanisms. 
 
Multi-Fiber Arrangement Quotas 
End in 2004 
 
International trade in textiles and apparel has been governed 
by quantitative restrictions under the Multi-Fiber 
Arrangement (MFA) and earlier agreements for more than 
30 years. One of the major results of the Uruguay Round was 
the conclusion of the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing 
(ATC), which provides for the dismantling of these 
restrictions. Under the ATC, the MFA restrictions are to be 
phased out over a 10-year period ending in 2004. 
 
The ATC provides the legal framework leading to a complete 
integration of this sector into the GATT at the end of the 
transition period. The MFA phaseout is comprised of two 
parts: a four-stage process eliminating import restraints con- 
tained in bilateral agreements previously negotiated on prod - 
ucts covered under the MFA, and an increase in quota 
growth rates for products still under restriction during the 
transition period. The ATC also deals with other non-MFA 
restraint measures relating to textiles and clothing. With the 
elimination of the MFA quotas and other restrictions, tariffs 
will become the primary mechanism for border protection, as 
the same rules will apply to trade in textiles and clothing as 
to trade in other goods. In the long run, the restraint reduc- 
tions will effectively improve market access for developing 
countries’ textile and clothing products in developed coun- 
tries. And at the same time, developed countries are already 
achieving the reciprocal access to developing countries’ tex - 
tile and apparel markets that was lacking before the ATC. 
 
Estimates of the impact of the ATC have varied widely. It is 
generally accepted that more clothing will be produced in 
developing countries and less in developed countries like the 
United States once the MFA quotas are terminated. 
However, the magnitude of the change and the distribution 
of the gains among developing countries varies between 
studies (Whalley, 1999). During the 1990’s, the United 
States and Western Europe increasingly sourced their cloth- 
ing imports from nearby regions rather than traditional 
Asian sources—from Mexico and the Caribbean Basin for 
the United States, and Eastern Europe and the 
Mediterranean for Western Europe. While this development 
in part represents preferential access granted to these 
regional clothing exporters under regional trade agreements 
such as NAFTA, it also represents the impact of structural 
change in apparel marketing and distribution. 
 
Timeliness is of greater importance in the apparel industry 
than ever before due to improvements in computing, com - 
munication, and transportation. Tighter inventory manage - 
ment and electronic collection and analysis of sales data by 
retailers have reduced order lag-times and increased the fre - 
quency of adjustment in styles and colors necessary to sat- 
isfy retailers. This places regional clothing producers at an 
advantage relative to distant Asian exporters, and the end of 
quota protection will not eliminate this advantage. 
 
India’s WTO dispute about import restraints illustrates one 
aspect of likely concerns about evolving textile trade rules 
in coming years—the assurance that developing countries 
will reduce the widespread trade barriers protecting their 
industries as the developed countries end the MFA quotas 
protecting theirs (ATMI, 2000). On the other hand, develop- 
ing countries have expressed concern with how developed 
countries have chosen to meet their commitments under the 
ATC, and how developed countries will respond to the new 
trade environment after 2004. Furthermore, even after textile 
and clothing trade is integrated into the WTO framework, 
tariff protection for the sector around the world remains well 
above the average for manufactured products. 
 
Exporter Policies and State-Trading 
 
India and Pakistan have significantly reduced their govern- 
ment role in cotton trading, and have become frequent net 
importers rather than exporters in recent years. However, 
several other traditional exporters maintain policies that may 
be relevant to future WTO negotiations. 
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Virtually no country currently subsidizes cotton exports, and 
only a handful of countries have export subsidy reduction 
obligations under the URAA (Brazil, Colombia, Israel, and 
South Africa). None of these countries have notified the WTO 
of any use of cotton export subsidies since 1995. However, 
the domestic policies of several major exporters— particularly 
with respect to STEs—may be relevant to WTO negotiations 
in future years. STEs can affect trade by influ- encing 
domestic and international prices in ways similar to the use of 
import tariffs and export subsidies (Ackerman and Dixit, 
1999). Negotiations in this area could be important 
for the U.S. cotton industry since STEs play prominent roles 
in the cotton industries of the United States’ leading export 
competitors, particularly in Central Asia and West Africa. 
(With the exception of Chinatex, STEs play little role in 
importing cotton.) 
 
The world’s largest exporter of cotton after the United States 
is Uzbekistan, which supplies about 16 percent of the cotton 
traded internationally (fig. A-1). Uzbekistan’s cotton output 
peaked a few years before it achieved independence in 1991. 
Since then, the impact of decades of environmental damage, 
a desire to increase self-sufficiency in grains, and the eco- 
nomic collapse of Russia—once Uzbekistan’s leading cus- 
tomer—have helped bring about a 40-percent decline in 
Uzbekistan’s production and exports of cotton (Isengildina, 
et al, 1998). 
 
Uzagroimpex, Uzbekistan’s STE for cotton, is the fourth 
largest cotton-trading organization in the world, according 
to estimates by the International Cotton Advisory 
Committee. It ranks just ahead of the Plains Cotton 
Cooperative Association in the United States, but behind the 
three largest U.S.-based private cotton merchants 
(Guitchounts, 1998). Economic reforms in Uzbekistan have 
not reached the point where cotton farmers have a viable 
alternative to selling their output to enterprises largely con- 
trolled by the state. Most cotton farms are also state-owned, 
and, although production is subsidized through nearly free 
irrigation water, subsidized lending, and inputs imported at 
preferential exchange rates, other policies such as state mar- 
keting orders more than offset these subsidies. The net 
impact of government policies in Uzbekistan is a taxation of 
agriculture that the World Bank estimated equaled 4.5 per- 
cent of gross domestic product (GDP) in 1998. 
 
According to the International Monetary Fund, the govern- 
ment is using an overvalued exchange rate, government-set 
prices, and delayed payments to farmers to transfer resources 
from cotton producers to the textile industry (IMF, 1999). 
Turkmenistan, the second largest cotton producer in Central 
Asia, also retains significant vestiges of centralized planning 
for cotton and the rest of its economy, with virtually all cot- 
ton sold under state order. Neither country is a WTO mem - 
ber, with Uzbekistan’s accession talks at a preliminary stage 
and Turkmenistan yet to apply for membership. 
 
 
 
Collectively, exports by the West African Francophone cot - 
ton producers nearly equal those of Uzbekistan (fig. A-1). 
Before their independence, these countries’ cotton was mar- 
keted through France’s parastatal Compagnie Francaise pour 
le Development des Fibres Textiles (CFDT). After indepen- 
dence, CFDT’s role was replaced by local African paras- 
tatals, with CFDT maintaining an equity interest in these 
companies, and much of the cotton continues to be marketed 
through COPACO (Compagnie Cotonniere, a private firm 
affiliated with CFDT). Until recently, each local parastatal 
supplied local farmer associations with inputs, and pur - 
chased, transported, ginned, and marketed the entire crop. 
Since these parastatals had a legal monopoly on cotton pur- 
chasing within their respective countries, and marketed their 
cotton internationally, they appear to meet the definition of a 
STE in the WTO Understanding on the Interpretation of 
Article XVII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
1994. However, none of the major West African cotton- 
exporting WTO members have notified the WTO regarding 
whether or not they maintain any STEs. 
 
Financial difficulties by several parastatals during the early 
1990’s and recent efforts by the World Bank to increase pri- 
vate sector participation in cotton marketing have resulted in 
some changes in the last few years. The establishment of 
private ginning companies has been permitted in some coun- 
tries, and Cote d’Ivoire’s la Compagnie Ivoirienne pour la 
Development des Textiles (CIDT) was split into three com- 
panies in 1998. However, Cote d’Ivoire’s Government 
retains control of one company, and privatization is still at 
the planning stage in Mali, the region’s largest producer 
(Levin, 2000). 
 
While the role of West African parastatals is prominent 
within their respective countries, none of them ranks among 
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the world’s largest cotton-trading organizations. The fourth 
largest government cotton-trading organization—after 
Uzagroimpex, Chinatex and India’s CCI—is Syria’s Cotton 
Marketing Organization (CMO). These four were the only 
STEs ranking among the world’s 20 largest cotton trading 
organizations. According to the ICAC, CCI ranked 15th, and 
the CMO ranked 16th among world cotton-trading organiza- 
tions in 1998. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The future of U.S. cotton exports will depend on, 1) con- 
sumption gains in markets relying largely on imported cot- 
ton, like Mexico and Southeast Asia, and 2) the degree that 
cotton producers like China, Turkey, and Brazil rely on 
imports rather than domestic production to meet the grow - 
ing needs of their textile industries. The impending reform 
of world textile trade by the WTO’s 2004 deadline will put 
pressure on textile industries in developed countries, but will 
improve the outlook for consumption by developing coun - 
tries. The application of current textile trade rules and the 
development of future policies is of interest to both devel- 
oped and developing countries, and could affect the location 
of textile production and cotton demand. The growing 
import role of cotton producers suggests that cotton trade 
will increasingly benefit from the discipline that multilateral 
negotiations bring to global market access. China’s acces- 
sion would bring the market access policies of an important 
frequent importer under WTO discipline, and would affect 
the role of one off the world’s largest STEs trading cotton. 
While the role of STEs in global cotton trade has declined 
in recent years, they remain important for the largest U.S. 
export competitors. 
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